S. N. Eisenstadt

The Department of Sociology and Anthropology
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
and
The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute

 

I

In the contemporary era there have been taking place in Europe – indeed throughout the world – far-reaching changes and transformation of public spheres, civil society and conceptions of citizenship, in close relation to the crystallization of new patterns of collective identity – processes which entail far-reaching transformations of some aspects of what has been envisaged as the “classical” nation-state or the decomposition of some of its components.

These far-reaching changes, decline or transformation of the ideological and institutional premises of the modern nation state developed in a specific historical context. The most important characteristic of this new context was the combination of first, changes in the international systems and shifts of hegemonies within them; second, processes of internal ideological changes in Western societies; third, the development of new processes of globalization; and fourth, far-reaching processes of democratization, of the growing demands of various social sectors for access into the centers of their respective societies, as well as into international arenas.

The most important aspect of the new international scene that developed in this period was first, the undermining of some of the “older” Western hegemonies and of the modernizing regimes in different non-Western societies; often in situations in which the perception of such weakening became relatively strong among active elites in the non-Western countries – as for instance after the October War and the oil shortage in the West. A crucial event on the international scene was the demise of the Soviet Union and of the salience of the ideological confrontation between Communism and the West – a demise which was sometimes perhaps paradoxically interpreted as an exhaustion of the Western cultural program of modernity and as signalling the end of “history.” Concomitantly there took place continuous shifts in the relative hegemony of different centers of modernity – in Europe and the U.S., moving to East Asia and back to the U.S. – shifts which became continually connected with growing contestations between such centers around their presumed hegemonic standing.

Second, these developments were closely related to internal ideological changes in Western society – to the development of what has been called “post-modern” or “post-materialist” orientations; and to the concomitant continual decomposition of the relatively compact image of the “civilized man,” of the styles of life, of construction of life worlds, which were connected with the first original programs of modernity, and the development of a much greater pluralization and heterogenization of such images and representations, and of new patterns of differentiation and syncretization between different cultural traditions, so aptly analyzed by Ulf Hannerz.

Concomitantly, on the structural-institutional level, there developed a weakening of the former, relatively rigid, homogenous definition of life patterns, and hence also of the boundaries of family, community, or of spatial and social organization. Occupational, family, gender and residential roles have become more and more dissociated from “Stande,” class, and party-political frameworks, and tend to crystallize into continuously changing clusters with relatively weak orientations to such broad frameworks in general, and to the societal centers in particular.

On the cultural level these developments entailed first, a growing tendency to distinguish between Zweckrationalität and Wertrationalität, and to the recognition of a great multiplicity of different Wertrationalitäten. Cognitive rationality – especially as epitomized in the extreme forms of scientism – has become dethroned from its relatively hegemonic position, as has been the idea of the “conquest” of mastery of the environment – whether of society or of nature.

Third, there developed in this period multiple new processes of economic and cultural globalization, manifest in growing autonomy of world capitalist forces, of processes of intense social and economic dislocations of many social sectors, of growing gaps between different sectors of the population, between global and local cities; and the erosion of many middle-class sectors; of intense movements of international migrations, and of the concomitant development on an international scale of social problems, such as prostitution, delinquency, traffic in drugs and the like. In the cultural arena the processes of globalization were closely connected with the expansion especially through the major media of what were often conceived in many parts of the world as uniform hegemonic Western, above all American, cultural programs or visions.

Fourth, all these developments were at the same time connected throughout the world with growing demands of many social sectors to greater access to participation in the central frameworks of their societies – i.e. to growing democratization.

All these processes entailed a far-reaching transformation of the “classical” model of the nation and revolutionary states which were predominant in the earlier period. All these processes reduced, despite the continual strengthening of the “technocratic” rational secular policies in various arenas – be it in education or family planning – the control of the nation state over its own economic and political affairs. At the same time the nation states lost some of their – always only partial – monopoly of internal and international violence to many local and international groups of separatists or terrorists without any nation-state or the concerted activities of nation states being able to control the continually recurring occurrences of such violence. Above all the ideological and symbolic centrality of the nation and revolutionary states, of their being perceived as the major bearers of the cultural program of modernity and the basic frameworks of collective identity and as the major regulator of the various secondary identities, became weakened, and new political and social and civilizational visions developed.

All these processes and movements attested to a far-reaching shift from viewing the political centers and the nation-state as the basic arenas in which the charismatic dimension of the ontological and social visions are implemented. Concomitantly, these developments also entailed a very important shift of the utopian orientations predominant in these societies form the construction of modern centers to other arenas.

 

Among the bearers of the new political and ideological visions various new social movements were of great importance. The first, even chronologically, such movements were the “new” social movements such as women’s and the ecological movements that developed in most western countries most of all closely related or rooted in the student and anti-Vietnam war movements of the late sixties and seventies. Instead of a conflictual-ideological focus on the center and its reconstitution or on economic conflicts, both of which characterized the earlier “classical” social movements of modern and industrial societies, the new movements emphasized the construction of new social and cultural spaces and identities which claimed, as against orientations to the center, growing cultural autonomy for the newly emerging local, regional, and transnational cultural spaces and conceptions of collective identity – in general in the directions of “postmodernity” and multiculturalism.

The second major type of new movements which started to develop, albeit somewhat later, in this period and occupied more and more the center stage on the international scene were the fundamentalist and communal religious movements which promulgated strong anti-modern, or anti-Enlightenment ones – and some of them also strong anti-Western themes. Although these movements developed above all in the non-Western societies – especially in different Muslim societies – and the communal religious ones – in the Hinduist and Buddhist ones, they became also visible in Europe and in the U.S. where indeed the first modern fundamentalist – Protestant – movements developed.

Concomitantly there developed in many societies new social sectors – the most important among which were the new types of Diasporas and of minorities which crystallized in the contemporary world. The best known among such Diasporas are the Muslim one – or ones – especially in Europe and to some extent in the U.S. Parallel developments – yet with significant differences – are to be found among the Chinese and possibly Korean ones in East Asia and in the U.S. and also in Europe, as well as among Jewish communities especially in Europe. The new types of minorities that we refer to are best illustrated by the Russian ones in some of the former Soviet Republics – especially in the Baltics and in some of the Asian ones; and for instance such as the Hungarian ones in the former East European Communist states. These Russian Diasporas should be also compared with the Jews from different former Soviet Republics who came to Israel. Concomitantly, some of the other "traditional" Diasporas – perhaps above all the Jewish ones – have been greatly transformed. On the one hand they have become more - if not always - fully accepted in the countries in which they live, especially in Europe. On the other hand new European Jewish organizations like the European-Jewish Congress have emerged greatly emphasizing the European-Jewish – as distinct from American or Israeli identities – even if in close relation to them.

 

Within the framework of all these processes there took place the crystallization of new types of collective identities all of which went indeed far beyond the classical models of the nation state.

Truly enough, even in the period of the presumed hegemony of this model, there existed, even if often in subdued and sub-terranian ways, a much greater variety and heterogeneity of collective identities that was presumed in the homogenizing models of the nation-state. Regional, “cultural,” religious, linguistic identities and cultural space did not disappear – and they would naturally be stronger in those societies like for instance England in which multi-faceted patterns of collective identity prevailed with its strong secular homogenizing premises. In other societies such as Imperial Germany, they could become foci of political contestation. Closely related was the continual reconstruction of seemingly “non-rational” romantic or esoteric of mystic modes of cultural experience.

But however strong these variegated patterns were, there is no doubt that during the heydays of the constitution of nation-states most of these identities – with the partial exception of the religious, especially the Catholic and the Jewish one – were in a way marginalized from the central public domain or arena. They were relegated to the private domain and at most accepted semi-publicly in a very limited way. They did not constitute major components of the central cultural and political program as promulgated by the central socializing agencies of the nation-state – such as the educational system, the army and the different mass-media – newspapers and popular books – in the earlier periods of the development of the nation state; of radio and television later on. Above all, they did not constitute the central pivot of the defining of formal membership in the nation-state – namely of citizenship, and of the various entitlements attendant on the acquisition of citizenship. Similarly in this period the ideological cultural and institutional relation between various immigrant communities with their mother countries were to a very large extent indicated by the images of the new nation state and by its model of citizenship presumably based on universalistic homogeneous criteria.

Truly enough, contrary to many implicit liberal assumptions, citizenship was never “culture-blind” or cultural neutral citizenship usually entailed the participation in a distinct community or “nation” and the acceptance of some at least of its ways of life and collective identities. But such ways of life and identities were usually defined in terms of the homogenizing premises of the nation-state and of the “civilizing” process or program of modernity connected with it. The promulgation of these homogenizing tendencies of the nation-state was closely connected with that of the ideal human type, the ideal civilized person, as the bearers of the civilizing processes and with the master historical and ontological narratives of modernity, be it of progress, especially of progress of reason, or is in the Romantic versions of the unfolding of the distinct cultural features of different collectivities.

 

The collective identities which have been constructed in the contemporary era entailed far-reaching changes in this model of the nation-state. One of the most important developments on the contemporary scene has been that most such hitherto “subdued” identities moved – albeit naturally in a highly reconstructed way – into the centers of their respective societies, contesting the hegemony of the older homogenizing programs thereof or claiming their own autonomous places in the central symbolic and institutional spaces – be it in educational programs, in public communications and media and very often they are making also far-reaching claims with respect to the redefinition of citizenship and of rights and entitlements connected with it.

The common denominator of both these new Diasporas and minorities – and closely related to the new visions promulgated by the various new movements – is that they do not see themselves as bound by the strong homogenizing cultural premises of the classical mode of the nation state – especially by the places allotted to them in the public spheres of such states.

It is not that they do not want to be “domiciled” in their respective countries. Indeed part of their struggle is to become so domiciled – but on rather new – as compared to classical models of assimilation – terms. They want to be recognized in the public spheres, in the constitution of the civil society in relation to the state as culturally distinct groups promulgating their collective identities and not to confine them only to the private sphere. Thus they do indeed make claims – as illustrated among others for instance in the new debate about laïcité in France – for the reconstruction of the symbols of collective identity promulgated in respective states.

Moreover while the identities which they promulgate are often very local and particularistic – in many ways similar to many new ethnic ones – they tend also to be strongly transnational or transstate ones. This is very clear in the case of the Muslim one but in different ways this is true also of the other groups – including the new Jewish ones – especially in Europe. Parallel “trans-national” identities are promulgated by some of the new minorities. All these developments entail potential changes in the definition of citizenship and struggles and contestations about them.

All these developments enabled tendencies to the redefinition of boundaries of collectivities: and to the development of new nuclei of cultural and social identities which transcend the existing political and cultural boundaries, and of new ways of combining “local” and “minimal” transnational orientations. In many of these movements, as for instance among many of the New Diasporas or minorities – the local and the transnational often universalistic themes and orientations were often brought together in new ways. Thus while many of these new collective identities have emphasized local or particularistic themes – against the homogenizing universalistic premises of the nation states, but at the same time many of them promulgated broader – transnational or transstate identities – often universalistic orientations going beyond those of the nation state. Illustration of such orientations are new European ones; or those rooted in the great religious – Islam, Buddhism, even different branches of Christianity – reconstructed in the modern ways.

 

All these developments entail far-reaching changes in the constitution of public spheres and of the relations between civil society and the political sphere – both within different states as well as on the international scene – and in the concomitant conceptions of citizenship – round all these problems there develop in many societies intensive contestations and struggles.

They posit far-reaching claims to the redefinition of citizenship and the rights and entitlements connected with it. They do make claims –both for the construction of new public spaces and for the reconstruction of the symbols of collective identity promulgated in respective states. Concomitantly there developed within these movements and sectors an important, even radical, shift in the discourse about the confrontation with modernity and in the conceptualization of the relation between the Western and non-Western civilizations, religions or societies. All these developments gave rise also to a great challenge to educational institutions which faced the problem of how to cope with class and the various multiple identities as against the traditional curricular rooted in the homogeneous conceptions of the different nation-states.

All these changes took place in most European countries, but their concrete contours and impact varied between European societies. These differences could be seen, for instance, as Dominique Schnapper has pointed out, in the ways in which such different minority groups are designated in different European societies, “strangers” in Germany, “racial minorities” in England, “immigrants” in France, “ethnic and cultural minorities” in the Netherlands and the like. These differences were influenced, among others, by the extent of the homogeneity of the different European nation-states; by the extent to which they were highly homogeneous, as in France, or in different mode in Scandinavian countries; or more multifaceted as in Great Britain and the Netherlands; by the place of religious symbols and traditions in the construction of nations’ identities; by different ways in which State-Church religion relations have been worked out in these societies. They develop also, needless to say, in different ways in societies beyond Europe.      

 

One central theme promulgated in these movements and sectors has been the concern with the growing homogenization of global culture to the detriment or at the expense of more authentic cultural communities and traditions. One of the most important developments on the contemporary scene has been that most such hitherto “subdued” identities moved – albeit naturally in a highly reconstructed way – into the centers of their respective societies, contesting the hegemony of the older homogenizing programs thereof or claiming their own autonomous places in the central symbolic and institutional spaces – be it in educational programs, in public communications and media and very often they are making also far-reaching claims with respect to the redefinition of citizenship and of rights and entitlements connected with it.

This concern constitutes also indeed one of the major butts of contemporary radical criticism of globalization. It is however important to remember that this theme of the danger attendant on the expansion of modern cultural and political program to the respective traditions of different societies and groups is not new in modern history and in the discourse of modernity. It constituted a basic component in the discourse and as it developed with the crystallization and expansion of modernity from its very beginning. This problematique did develop already within the very onset of the Western program of modernity with different centers and becoming the foci and targets of such and different countries and centers that were seen in different periods as constituting such major dangers as the bearers of the hegemonic tendencies. These confrontations continued as central foci of the discourse of modernity albeit in a different vein with the expansion of European modernity to the Americas. This confrontation became even more intensified with the expansion of European, the western modernity beyond the West – into Asian – Muslim, Chinese, Hinduist and Buddhist societies and into the many societies in Africa. The fear of erosion of local cultures and the impact of globalization and its centers was however also continuously connected in an oscillating way with an ambivalence towards these centers.

One of the most important developments on the contemporary scene has been that most such hitherto “subdued” identities moved – albeit naturally in a highly reconstructed way – into the centers of their respective societies, contesting the hegemony of the older homogenizing programs thereof or claiming their own autonomous places in the central symbolic and institutional spaces – be it in educational programs, in public communications and media and very often they are making also far-reaching claims with respect to the redefinition of citizenship and of rights and entitlements connected with it.

All these themes were taken up again in the new contemporary scene, in the new settings and by the new movements. There are, however, some specific new elements which can be identified on the contemporary scene as compared both with earlier historical periods as well as with those in the earlier stages of modernity.

What is new in the contemporary era, is first the worldwide reach and diffusion of these themes, and their continual interweaving with fierce political contestations. These discourses moved in the centers of national and international political arenas – and when combined with political, military or economic struggles and conflicts could indeed have become very violent.

Second is the fact that in this discourse a very important shift has taken place in the confrontation between the western and non-western civilizations or societies. As against the seeming acceptance and of these premises combined with the continual reinterpretation thereof that was characteristic of the earlier movements, most of the contemporary fundamentalist and communal religious movements and also many postmodern ones as well as the more general discourse of modernity promulgated a seeming negation of at least some of these premises, a markedly confrontational attitude to the West, and attempts to appropriate the global system on their own terms couched in modern, but non-Western, often anti-Western, mode.

Third, in many countries there developed also intensive – even if milder confrontations between the interpretations of multiculturalism by the official representatives of the state who often opened up themselves to the multiculturalist demand but who were seen by other leaders of such groups as organizing such multiculturalism within the existing premises of the nation-state, as against claims for more authentic, autonomous definitions of the identity of such different groups, by these leaders. The confrontation, between these different leaders were very about who could be, who would be the gatekeepers of the newly redefined boundaries of the collective identities of the communities, who would be the legitimate promulgator of their symbols, and as to the proper way of representation of these symbols.

In these movements the basic tensions inherent in the constitution of modern states, in the modern political program, especially those between the pluralistic and totalistic orientations; between utopian or more open and pragmatic attitudes, between multifaceted as against closed collective identities, are placed. The mode in which these tensions work out, especially whether they develop in an open pluralistic way as well as the opposite, highly aggressive and totalitarian directions, with growing inter-ethnic or inter-religious conflicts, depends greatly on the extent to which the aggressive and destructive potentialities inherent in these movements will become predominant or tamed and transformed.

The analysis of these developments and of their common characteristics as well as differences within Europe and in other parts of the world, should constitute subjects of systematic comparative research.

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